job or two, for years at a time. Employers distrusted their job qualifications; they would not hire them for any reason at any wage. Minimum wage requirements (in effect as National Recovery Administration [NRA] codes from 1933 to 1935, and permanently from 1938 to the present) made it even more difficult to hire them. Some entry into the hard core resulted when people moved from a "normal" status to one where severe discrimination existed-for example when blacks migrated from the rural South to urban areas, and when middle-aged workers became, at age forty-five or fifty, "too old."5 A striking feature of the I930s was that most unemployment was of the hard-core variety (see Table I ). Hard-core unemployment was rare before 1931; not since 1942 has more than I percent of the labor force been unemployed longer than one year or 2 percent been unemployed over six months. In the Great Depression, prolonged cyclical unemployment turned into irreversible structural unemployment for IO percent of the labor force. Five million previously "normal" workers suddenly and utterly unexpectedly fell into the hard core trap and could not escape. Why did this happen and to whom? How did the government help or hurt? How did the hard core finally shrink from a major to a minor problem? These are my central themes. Table I In hard times, there were many applicants eager for jobs, and businesses would hire them unless their current employees agreed to accept the lower wage rates. A "reserve army of the unemployed," standing in long queues outside the hiring gate, allowed firms to keep wages low.7 According to this view, higher unemployment caused lower wages. One problem with this model is that its predictions for the 193os are wrong. Real hourly wages did not fall during the depression-they held steady or even rose. The unemployed and low-wage workers did not bid away jobs. We should not be misled by stories about unemployed who would work at any wage, no matter how low. There were millions of such people but (apart from "odd jobs" that rarely were reported), they were not hired. Table 2 shows the basic patterns of nominal (cash) wages in column 2, real wage rates (adjusted for the cost of living) in manufacturing in column 3, and the productivity of the factory work force in columns 4 and 5 for 1927 to I940. Cash wages fell less than the cost of living, so the real wage rate rose steadily (1932 excepted) throughout the depression. Indeed, the 45 percent surge from 1930 to 1940 was the greatest on record. Table 2 focuses on manufacturing, but the phenomenon was broad. In each sector, let Ioo percent equal the real annual pay of full-time employees from I926 to 1929. Consider only the paid work force-no owners or self-employed. In the early depression, I93 I through I935, average annual real pay for an employee with no unemployment rose in utilities (to I25 percent), government ( 14 percent), services (excluding domestics) (12 percent), transportation (II2 percent), and trade (io8 percent). Pay held steady in finance (103 percent) and manufacturing (99 percent), and fell in mining (89 percent), farm labor (86 percent), domestic service (85 percent), and construction (74 percent). The overall average was 103 percent. Actual incomes were much lower-at 76 percentbecause of unemployment, not wage cuts. Unions, then at their weakest, had little to do with these wage gains. ers. A lack of purchasing power would lead to underconsumption, which spelled depression. Most economists rejected this line of thought, but it proved unusually attractive to businessmen and politicians (and historians).9 From the business perspective, labor costs remained high. Wages deflated by the wholesale cost index climbed steadily (Table 2 , column 4), except under the extreme conditions of I932 and 1933-and, even then, the index was higher than ever before I930. The puzzle is why businessmen, faced with the worst crisis ever, clung to a new, untested policy that was at once counterintuitive, attacked by economists, and unsuccessful in its macroeconomic prediction that prosperity was just around the corner. The explanation is that they were practicing not macroeconomics but microeconomics, with a personnel policy that gave them good reasons for keeping wages high. Only in the mid I98os did economists come to appreciate what the businessmen were doing: they were following an "efficiency wage" policy, not basing their decisions on a high-wage theory of prosperity.
By the I920s it was no longer true that firms could increase their profits by cutting wages. Paradoxically, a better way to increase profits was to increase wages. The labor cost of a firm increased with the wage rate, but it decreased with the rising productivity of the workers. A wage hike that improved productivity more than the cost of the extra wages increased profits. High pay attracted better workers who produced much more, so fewer were needed. Conversely, if wage cuts drove away the best workers, productivity and profits would fall. For employers, the optimal wage-optimal in terms of profitability for the firmwas the efficiency wage. It did not clear the labor market: millions of applicants were eager to take jobs at the high rates, but were turned away at the hiring gate in the I930s.10 With the end of large-scale unskilled immigration in 1914, American industry shifted from reliance on a vast supply of unskilled workers performing heavy or repetitive tasks, to more skilled workers using more machinery in more complex ways, under the eyes of engineers watching for signs of waste or possibilities for improvements. Industry was now run by the designs of modern engineers, not the craft of traditional workers. Business managers had to be ready to retool their operations with new products, new equipment, and new methods whenever demand shifted. Therefore the modern worker had to be trained in shop techniques, and had to follow the new discipline. High turnover rates, which had been universal a few years before, now meant unacceptably high and wasteful training costs. A revolution in labor management took place during the I920s, spurred by the realization that the old regime was inefficient and less profitable. 1
The new policies were designed to identify and keep the more efficient workers, and to encourage other workers to emulate them. Various experiments were undertaken in "welfare capitalism" (that is, non-wage benefits, like pensions, vacations, and company unions). More important were the innovations in hiring policies such as moving authority from foremen to central offices, using application forms, checking with previous employers, and giving tests. As sales and profits plummeted during the depression, firms hastened to install more efficient personnel practices. The proportion of firms with personnel departments jumped from 34 percent in I927 to 47 percent in I937, and almost no firms hired without an interview or application form. Five out of six firms surveyed the local labor market regularly to see that their wages were competitive for good workers.12 This revolution in management caused real wages to grow, productivity to grow, and, after the depression had bottomed out, left a residue of hardcore unemployed who were no longer being hired.
Before 1920, most job applicants looked alike to management. In the new regime, it paid to sort them out. The key ingredient in increasing productivity, as Ford had demonstrated to a stunned world in I914 with his $5-wage, was to offer high pay to attract and retain the best workers. A more subtle variation on efficiency wages, with the effect of keeping the more productive workers, was to tie wage rates and recalls after layoffs to seniority. Workers realized that the longer they stayed with a firm, the more their wages, prerequisites and job security would increase.13 A second dimension of efficiency wages involved shirking and stints. Some workers (some of the time) have an inner drive to work hard; most workers (most of the time) are willing to coast a little. Furthermore, shop-floor culture in the United States (as opposed to, say, Japan) encouraged peer group pressure against anyone who tried to work too hard.14 Close supervision to monitor output was expensive and was, in any case, keenly resented by good workers. It was better to select workers who were less inclined to shirk by offering high wages and to use a trial work period to screen out any shirkers who slipped through. Spot checks to identify and fire shirkers made loafing expensive for the workers; the higher the wage, the greater the possible loss. Closely related to shirking was the problem of the stint. A group of workers would develop a standard rate of performancea stint-and would harass shop mates who surpassed it. When management tried to increase the stint, workers denounced it as a "speedup" and threatened to strike. But the stint, and the perception of speedup, were relative and psychological. By careful selection, it was possible to find those workers with higher stint levels and to create groups that naturally produced more-working faster and with less waste-than groups held back by workers with lower stint levels. Every employer wanted high-stint workers, and so had to pay more to hire and retain them. Efficiency wages and careful hiring policies allowed firms to select workers who demonstrated higher stint rates-who worked harder. Firms which gained a reputation for high wages and hard work, soon attracted and kept workers who felt comfortable with such a regime. Workers without the characteristics desired by management were not hired (except by mistake-and then quickly fired).15 The rising real wages are explained by efficiency wage models only if productivity increased; otherwise, management would be making a huge mistake in paying more wages but getting no more output. Table 2 shows that productivity (column 5) rose in parallel with the cost of labor (column 4), thus vindicating the new managerial system. The "common sense" notion that people were unemployed because there were not enough jobs was only partially true. There were indeed fewer jobs than potential workers. However, the work force of the I930S was constantly churning, with people moving between jobs all of the time. When dealing with a decade of massive unemployment, it is easy to forget how much hiring occurred. From 193I through I935, with an average roster in manufacturing of 8.o million workers, the voluntary quit rate was 9 workers per I,ooo per month (69,000 every month), the layoff/ discharge rate was 31 (249,000 every month), and the hiring rate Efficiency-wage models help to explain key elements of the labor market during the depression. When a firm was hiring, it would look at the applicants' wage histories. Men who had earned high wages elsewhere were assumed to have passed the efficiency test, and were more likely to be hired. Those who had earned low wages previously were, by contrast, considered a greater risk, even if (indeed, especially if) they were willing to work for a low wage. Support of this model comes from a study of the reemployment of workers who had lost their jobs when several factories in Massachusetts closed in 193I. Two years later, only 40 percent had found regular permanent jobs, but this figure included 54 percent of the workers formerly in the top one third by pay, 41 percent in the middle, and only 27 percent in the bottom third. With increased mechanization, demand for unskilled labor fell precipitously. Even unskilled applicants with good employment records were not hired, for they had not demonstrated an ability to learn on the job. Furthermore, they risked being "bumped" by skilled or semiskilled workers who were willing to perform unskilled labor.21
The unskilled had by far the highest unemployment rates. Table 3 Michigan in January I935. Different industries were hurt at different rates, but, inside each industry, the success of the more skilled workers in avoiding unemployment is clear. Unemployment rates by occupation and education in I935 are shown for Michigan (Table 4) , and for the entire urban United States in Table 5 . Human capital was a personal asset that sharply reduced the risk of unemployment. In part, more schooling allowed people into white collar jobs that had lower unemployment rates. But, after controlling for occupation, education still made a large difference, since it indicated native intelligence, stock of knowledge, and skill at learning. The last talent in particular would be rewarded by employers using an efficiency-wage approach.
Efficiency models strongly suggest that firms would retain workers with better performance records. The main criteria used in selecting whom to lay off, according to statements of personnel officers and other executives, were competence (71 percent of firms), length of service (72 percent), and family situation (53 percent). Indeed in practice in New York factories, layoff rates declined sharply with seniority. In railroads, the annual layoff rate often, and recalled to old jobs more often. But it was clear by the late I920s and early I930S that most firms were reluctant to hire new men over the age of forty-five. Various reasons were givenincreased pension costs, difficulty of training them to new shop styles, and higher accident rates-but probably a strong (and new) prejudice was at work. In any case, men over fifty who had lost their jobs had a hard time finding new ones. A U-shaped distribution had emerged, giving grounds for governmental efforts to remove the unemployable young and old from the labor supply.
Because of the growth of education, older workers had both more seniority and less schooling. To disentangle this interaction, we use multiple classification analysis (MCA) to reveal the separate contributions of age, education and occupation on unemployment rates for all urban men in the winter of 1935 to I936. Table 5 shows that schooling was directly tied to employment. Of men who had less than seven years of school, 30 percent were unemployed, compared with I8 percent of those who had graduated from elementary school. We can highlight the effect of education and age by looking at the data on unskilled men in Table 5 . Given that "unskilled" labor meant simple physical work requiring no schooling-shoveling, sweeping, pushing, and pulling-it would seem that education should have no correlation with unemployment among the unskilled. Analysis of the data revealed a stunning finding: schooling was even more important for unskilled workers than for other workers. Additional years in the classroom gave applicants an edge for unskilled jobs-perhaps because employers felt that they worked harder or understood directions better, or because they were better able to find such jobs in the first place.23 Civilian Conservation Corps (ccc) kept several hundred thousand young men at a time off the labor market. Child labor codes in the NRA effectively removed youths under sixteen from the labor market, and home work was drastically curtailed. Public opinion strongly supported federal and state efforts, echoed by many local governments, school boards, utilities, and other large employers, to prevent wives from working if the husband (the "breadwinner") had a job. Alien Mexican families were given one-way rail tickets back home. The Social Security program did not have much effect on older people until the I950s, but meanwhile railroad retirement and old age assistance for the poor who stopped looking for jobs reduced the supply of labor.
As late as 1937, Roosevelt's aides were drafting laws to shorten the work week to thirty-five hours, require premium pay for overtime, and fix the minimum hourly wage at 80 cents (far above the prevailing 63-cent rate). ery to come out of Washington. Other years, spending was too low, and taxes were too high to stimulate the economy. It is hard to see how the New Deal could have spent much more money than it did. Tax cuts were never on the New Deal agenda. Taxes were raised regularly throughout the decade, to score political points at the federal level and to cover the huge rise in relief costs and decline in revenues at the state level. Indeed, Washington demanded that the states raise taxes to cover their share of the relief burden. 26 Economists agree that Keynesian stimuli would not have helped structural or hard-core unemployment, only cyclical unemployment. As Table I In a deeper sense, the New Dealers were unwilling or unable to collaborate with business. They planned structurally to "reform" business rather than help it to promote structural "recovery." High-wage doctrine suggested building up labor unions to enhance their "bargaining power" in negotiating higher wages with management. Problems arose because pressure for higher wages also was pressure for efficiency wages. In addition, after 1935 the new unions demanded seniority provisions to protect their core workers; management agreed in order to avert strikes. Seniority helped to protect the better workers against unemployment; it worsened the troubles of marginal workers.29
The third structural alternative was training to enhance the productivity of the hard-core unemployed. In macroeconomic terms, increasing the productivity of labor is the best way to reduce unemployment permanently without causing damaging side effects like inflation. A silent, deadly effect of the Great Beyond the training opportunities lost, an equally serious criticism is that the main work-relief programs, especially the WPA, had a negative training effect. Nine of ten WPA jobs were unskilled; when heavy construction equipment was used, an operator not on relief would be called in. Job skills rusted; the stimulus of ambition through promotions, pay raises, and seniority was stifled; the rhythms of industrial time were forgotten; the efficiency-wage imperatives against slacking were ignored. In stark contrast to normal work environments, in the WPA the most senior employees were the worst workers: the least skilled, the least employable, and the least likely to offer leadership to their co-workers. Since there was a cap on the maximum amount a person could earn each month on the WPA, and since every worker was supposed to receive the "prevailing" (that is, union) hourly wage, the number of hours a month a person was allowed to work varied greatly. The most skilled worked only forty-three hours a month, so they were often unavailable to help the less skilled. Furthermore, the "bosses" and foremen were chosen and motivated more by politics than ability, and were notoriously poor managers. Everywhere WPA workers were ridiculed and stigmatized as unsatisfactory employees. As a Boston employer grumbled, "They come to us with so many mind hazards that they are no good to us." Hallie Flanagan, the director of the WPA's theater project, told the poignant story of a delegation of her actors "complaining bitterly because I wanted them to have their names on programs." They feared they might be rejected for legitimate jobs if their WPA record were publicized. The government is paying your salary so "you'll be proud to have your name appear," Flanagan insisted to the distraught petitioners. According to one workers' spokesman, the WPA "has meant so much in hardship, humiliation, bad working conditions and jobs not in their own trade, that they want to get off the rolls as quickly as possible." While emergency relief workers were not getting either classroom or on-the-job training, their competitors in the labor force were moving ahead. One estimate is that the value of onthe-job training for employed men having only an elementary that incomes declined on average-they fell only to 1920 levelsbut that the burden was so unequally shared.
In recent years, some historians have attacked the New Deal as too fainthearted in its assault on unemployment. The WPA is criticized for reaching less than half the total unemployed, whereas the unrestricted Civil Works Administration (CWA) is celebrated. "WPA did not go far enough," concludes one leading historian. Its wages were inadequate, and its "halfway measures did not provide the massive stimulus the economy needed." A more radical historian announced, "The new semi-welfare state offered little immediate help to the poor." The criticism is misplaced. Omnibus public works programs, like the CWA and the Public Works Administration (PWA), focused on cyclical unemployment and reached normal workers more than the hard core. By I935, the New Deal realized that the hard core were a special problem (and a special political opportunity). Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins, his administrator of relief, designed their solution, the WPA, to aid the hard core by employing one person in each family on relief. By 1936 it was close to its projected numerical target, and paid wages higher than the hard-core unemployed could command on the market. People on relief vastly preferred it to the old system of cash payments ("home relief") because it gave them a productive role in society. The WPA provided more job security than they could earn with their poor job skills; they were under no pressure to search for regular jobs, and few did so.37
Although it is hardly original to observe that the war "cured" unemployment, it is difficult to decide exactly which wartime policies had which short-term effects. But we need to discover how the war cured hard-core unemployment permanently. On the supply side, the growth of high schools and colleges, the postwar draft, and Social Security retirements removed young and old from the labor force. Wartime training and experience, in industry and in the military, made workers more productive, and upgraded skills so that the supply of unskilled labor was much smaller. In terms of efficiency wages, employers reshaped jobs to suit the skills and increase the productivity of available workers. They had to use men (and women) whom they would not have dreamed of hiring a few years before.
Personnel management became even more important. The number of industrial-relations staff rose from 2.5 per Iooo employees in 1937 to 8.o in 1948. They were charged with improving productivity despite the extraordinary shortage of manpower, the high quit rates, the government-imposed wage freeze, and the new strength of labor unions. They dropped categorical restrictions against the poorly educated, the unemployed, women, the old, the handicapped, and sometimes, in spite of intense resistance, blacks. Recruitment of new workers became an art form, with sound trucks blaring in the streets beseeching people to come to work and earn big money. Jobs were restructured so that fewer skills were needed. Intensive in-shop and in-school training programs reached millions. Anyone with a modicum of skill was rapidly promoted, even to the status of foreman or instructor. The results further justified the use of efficiency-wage procedures, but this time efforts were made to find the right niches for workers who had been "hopelessly unemployable" in the I930s. 38 We can now explain the causes, characteristics, and cures of the extraordinary unemployment of the Great Depression.
Throughout the decade, 2 to 5 percent of the work force was experiencing normal or frictional unemployment. Cyclical "no fault" unemployment was a grave matter primarily from I931 to 1934, when it affected from 8 to I4 percent of the labor force. ideological grounds to consider wage subsidies or training programs guaranteed that the hard-core would stay down, even as they hailed Roosevelt for rescuing them from utter destitution. Subsidies and training would have reduced the structural unemployment that was the greater problem after late I933. The war, by removing millions of prime men from the labor market, by restructuring the work process, by subsidizing wages, and by massive retraining, finally gave the private sector the methods and the incentives to rehire the hard-core. Never since has hardcore unemployment affected more than one worker in a hundred. In long-term perspective, the shift to efficiency wages was a highly desirable, and widely accepted national decision, for it led to an affluent society, with high productivity, high wages, and a high standard of living. It necessitated a well-educated, hardworking labor force that would be eager for new training, and be willing to search for new jobs. It required as well astute business managers sensitive to the human-relations dimensions of productivity. It required a national commitment to education, and to a free flow of workers across space and across class boundaries. It required the ending of inefficient labor-such as child labor, casual unskilled work for subminimum wages, and sweatshop conditions. The old order, with heavy rates of turnover, low wages, and high insecurity, was doomed when Ford announced the $5-day.41 Republicans and Democrats, capitalists and unionists hailed the new order. Europeans were mesmerized by the vision of the future rising in the west. A member of Roosevelt's "Brain Trust" declared in 1933 that "A nation of well-paid workers, consuming most of the goods it produces, will be as near Utopia as we humans are ever likely to get."42 Today, Americans worry more about federal deficits and international competition, and realize that wages that are too high may cause the loss of jobs and even whole industries. The national consensus in 1988 was for structural solutions, based on education and training. Only after World War II replaced the New Deal did the nation adopt the structural reforms that were necessary to support the low unemployment, high productivity, high wage economy that the people sought. Meanwhile, the utterly unexpected consequence was a decade of hard-core unemployment.
